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INTRODUCTION  
Between climate change and the myriad other environmental 
hazards associated with fossil fuels, the need for renewable energy 
grows ever more urgent. For example, wind-energy production has 
experienced rapid growth in the past few years.1 In 2016, the United 
States Department of Energy (DOE) reported wind power to be the 
third largest source of electric-generating capacity in the United 
States, trailing behind only solar and natural gas.2 Furthermore, in the 
past decade cumulative wind-power capacity in the U.S. increased at 
an average rate of 30% per year.3 In 2016, the U.S. added 
approximately 8,203 megawatts (MW) of new wind capacity for a 
total capacity of 82,143 MW.4 Wind energy is clearly a rapidly 
expanding source of clean energy;5 however, it is not without its 
complications. In addition to land use,6 wildlife,7 aesthetic,8 and 
reliability9 concerns (among others), wind also presents some unique 
challenges to air navigation, both civilian and military.10 
This Article examines wind energy through the lens of national 
security. The benefit resides with helping the United States become 
energy independent.11 National-security concerns also present a cost 
because wind energy interferes with military radar, posing a potential 
                                                   
 1. See WIND TECHNOLOGIES MARKET REPORT, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY 6 
(2016) (“Global wind additions equaled roughly 54,600 GW in 2016, 14% below the 
record of 63,600 MW added in 2015. With its 8.2 GW representing 15% of new global 
installed capacity in 2016, the United States maintained its second-place position 
behind China.”).  
 2. Id. at 5. 
 3. Advantages and Challenges of Wind Energy, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
https://energy.gov/eere/wind/advantages-and-challenges-wind-energy 
[https://perma.cc/7W95-V3A4] (last visited Sept. 24, 2018) (“[W]ind now has the 
largest renewable generation capacity of all renewables in the United States.”). 
 4. RYAN WISER & MARK BOLINGER, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 2016 WIND 
TECHNOLOGIES MARKET REPORT 4 (2016), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/ 
2017/10/f37/2016_Wind_Technologies_Market_Report_101317.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H647-X5PK]. 
 5. See Advantages and Challenges of Wind Energy, supra note 3. 
 6. See WINDExchange Slideshows, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
https://windexchange.energy.gov/slideshows [https://perma.cc/VG3Z-SZJY] (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2018). 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See The Rise of Wind Energy Raises Questions About its Reliability, 
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (June 22, 2017) https://www.npr.org/2017/06/22/ 
532763718/the-rise-of-wind-energy-raises-questions-about-its-reliability 
[https://perma.cc/C8FM-2H33]. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See id. 
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threat to the systems that monitor possible attacks.12 This Article 
attempts to analyze the overall impact of wind energy while noting the 
inherent difficulties when so much uncertainty is involved in the 
process.  
Part I of this Article discusses the benefits of wind energy.13 Part 
II examines its costs, specifically its interference with radar, and what 
that means for national security.14 This Part focuses on the fact that 
wind turbines can cause significant interference with radar, a problem 
complicated by the disturbing reality that it currently lies beyond the 
Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) technological capabilities to 
determine whether and if such interference occurs.15 Part III outlines 
the federal process by which wind energy interference with radar is 
managed and the mitigation strategies used to reduce the 
interference.16 Part IV uses a 2010 wind-energy project in Oregon as a 
case study to illustrate the uncertainties in calculating the costs of wind 
energy.17 Part V discusses the current mitigation strategies employed 
by federal agencies to reduce the effects of wind development on radar 
systems.18 Part VI analyzes the hard and soft uncertainties associated 
with the effects that wind turbines have on military radars.19 
Finally, this Article concludes that logic and common sense 
require a precautionary approach to this problem. Until such time as 
DOD is able to determine whether and to what extent wind turbines 
cause interference, no new permits for wind-energy developments 
should issue for installations in proximity to military radar. In 
addition, current radar facilities should be retrofitted immediately to 
the extent possible, and additional resources should be devoted to 
resolving the interference problem. 
I. BENEFITS OF WIND ENERGY  
Among the clear benefits of wind energy is its role in combating 
the effects of climate change. According to the Energy Information 
Administration’s (EIA) 2016 Report, petroleum, natural gas, and coal 
                                                   
 12. See id. 
 13. See infra Part I. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See infra Section II.B. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. See infra Part V. 
 19. See infra Part VI. 
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constituted 81% of U.S. primary energy consumption20 and 
approximately 65% of electricity generation.21 All three of these 
sources contribute significantly to climate change.22 As of 2016, 
renewable energy sources (including wind) made up approximately 
10% of the primary energy consumption23 and approximately 15% of 
electricity generation.24 
This small percentage of renewable energy generation in the 
United States leaves a large potential for greenhouse gas (GHG) 
pollution displacement. As a DOE study noted, “[A] single 1.5 MW 
wind turbine displaces 2,700 tons of CO2 per year, or the equivalent 
of planting 4 square kilometers of forest every year.”25 In addition, 
manufacturing and building wind plants has a much smaller carbon 
                                                   
 20. U.S. Energy Facts Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/?page=us_energy_home 
[https://perma.cc/33MC-NZDC] (last updated May 16, 2018).  
 21. FAQs: What is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source?, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3 
[https://perma.cc/UQ4J-KBA5] (last visited Sept. 24, 2018). 
 22. Overview of Greenhouse Gases, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ 
ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases#carbon-dioxide [https://perma.cc/8F79-
8EHL] (last visited Sept. 24, 2018) (“In 2016, CO2 accounted for about 81.6% of all 
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions from human activities.”). Fossil fuels are the primary 
source of carbon dioxide. See id. 
 23. U.S. Energy Facts Explained, supra note 20.  
 24. FAQs: What is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source?, supra 
note 21. 
 25. 20% WIND ENERGY BY 2030, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY 107 (2008), 
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/41869.pdf [https://perma.cc/48N2-YJ6A].  
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footprint than that of other types of energy-generation installations.26 
So, from inception to generation, wind power is carbon efficient. 
Second, wind energy is domestically sourced, thus aiding in 
energy independence and security while reducing transportation 
costs.27 Furthermore, wind’s ability to displace fossil fuels will also 
help states meet increasingly stringent (state-based) regulatory 
requirements and programs designed to limit fossil fuel generation.28 
For example, a study in New York observed that if wind energy 
provided 10% of the state’s peak electricity demand, it would displace 
65% of the energy generated by natural gas, 15% of the energy 
produced by coal, and 10% of the energy that comes from oil.29  
Finally, wind energy does not contribute to other forms of 
ambient air pollution.30 It produces none of the commonly regulated 
pollutants—nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxides, mercury, and particulate 
matter—created through the burning of fossil fuels.31 These pollutants 
have been linked to a range of health problems including: neurological 
development in children, decreased lung function, respiratory 
infection, lung inflammation, and aggravation of respiratory illness.32 
Reducing airborne particulate matter also decreases the number of 
heart attacks and strokes and the number of hospital visits for asthma 
and cardiovascular disease.33 In light of this, the potential savings to 
both the nation and individuals from lowered health care costs 
resulting from decreased air pollution are substantial as well.34 
                                                   
 26. See id. at 108 (explaining that using wind instead of coal can reduce CO2 
emissions by 99%, and similarly, replacing natural gas with wind reduces CO2 
emissions by 98%). 
 27. See WIND TECHNOLOGIES MARKET REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.  
 28. See The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) Carbon Budget 
Training Program, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/rggi.html [https://perma.cc/8J7C-ME2J] (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2018). For example, New York, along with eight eastern states, developed 
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative as a “market-based emissions trading 
program” to promote a “clean-energy” future. Id. This initiative set a cap for 
greenhouse gas emissions from electric generating facilities that will decline over time 
and thereby slowly tighten the standards for carbon emissions. See id. 
 29. 20% WIND ENERGY BY 2030, supra note 25, at 108. 
 30. See id. at 13. 
 31. See The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, supra note 28; see also 42 
U.S.C. § 7412 (2012) (listing the hazardous air pollutants regulated by the Clean Air 
Act).  
 32. See Fast Facts about Health Effects of Air Pollution, CTR. FOR 
ECOGENETICS & ENVTL. HEALTH (Univ. of Wash.), May 2012, at 1, 
https://deohs.washington.edu/sites/default/files/FastFacts_AirPollution_12MAY10.p
df [https://perma.cc/JYR9-AMZJ]. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See Death in the Air: Air Pollution Costs Money and Lives, WORLD BANK 
(Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2016/09/ 
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Nevertheless, wind energy presents a major risk to national 
security. Wind turbines interfere with radar, including DOD military 
radar systems.35 Perhaps more troubling still is the fact that there is 
currently no accurate means of measuring the amount of interference 
these turbines cause nor indeed when and if it occurs.36 This threat 
impacts risk assessment and must be part of any analysis as to whether 
and how much of a role wind energy should play in our national 
energy strategy. 
II. COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH WIND ENERGY  
Wind turbines vary in size and are grouped into classes based on 
generating capacity: residential-scale onsite energy use (<10 kilowatts 
(kW)), small commercial-scale onsite energy use (10–50 kW), 
commercial onsite energy use (50–250 kW), large commercial or 
industrial energy use (500 kW–1.5 megawatts (MW)), and utility-
scale energy use (1.5–7.5 MW).37 The amount of regulatory 
involvement necessary to install wind turbines depends on the scale of 
the project. Turbines above 200 feet require approval from all 
government levels: federal, state, and local. Federal regulation 
requires turbines over 200 feet to go through a specific approval 
process38 before undergoing state and local approval processes, which 
vary by jurisdiction.39  
The federal government has jurisdiction over large commercial 
turbines and utility-scale turbines. Large commercial turbines can 
exceed 200 feet in height, and utility-scale turbines always exceed 200 
feet in height.40 Utility-scale turbines, the largest class and the type 
used for large wind farms, can have rotors exceeding 250 feet in 
                                                   
08/death-in-the-air-air-pollution-costs-money-and-lives [https://perma.cc/4HFK-
D3MF] (stating that air pollution is now the fourth leading risk factor for death 
worldwide).  
 35. See MICHAEL BRENNER, MITRE CORP., WIND FARMS AND RADAR 1 (Jan. 
2008), http://users.ece.utexas.edu/~ling/US1_Wind_Farms_and_Radar_ 
Brenner_USA.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UZ2-9YJ6]. 
 36. See id. 
 37. What is Wind Power?, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,  
https://windexchange.energy.gov/what-is-wind [https://perma.cc/X8UK-56G2] (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2018). 
 38. See infra Part III.  
 39. See, e.g., Wind Power, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/40966.html [https://perma.cc/XUC5-Y75X] (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2018). For example, New York law defines large wind projects as 
those of 25 MW or greater and requires developers of such projects to undertake a 
unified state and local permitting process. Id. 
 40. See What is Wind Power?, supra note 37.  
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diameter.41 In 2016, the average generating capacity of newly installed 
turbines was 2.15 MW, an increase of approximately 11% from the 
years 2011-2015.42 Furthermore, the diameter of the turbine rotors also 
saw a significant increase in 2016, jumping 13% to an average 
diameter of 108 meters.43  
Many wind turbines, especially utility-size aggregations (or 
“farms”), can impact all forms of radar—military, weather, and air 
traffic control.44 This Article focuses on the impacts to military radar 
systems. DOD notes that “[m]any governmental agencies . . . study[] 
wind turbine impacts on radar systems; however, no agency has 
successfully been able to relate impacts to quantifiable mission 
degradation.”45 DOD knows the potential for and the type of 
interference caused by wind turbines but not the amount of 
interference each turbine causes.46 As such, decisions by DOD 
regarding whether wind farms will cause undo interference with 
particular radar stations is closer to guesswork than precise 
forecasting. In a congressional hearing before the House Armed 
Services Subcommittee, Dr. Dorothy Robyn, Deputy Under Secretary 
of Defense, Installations and Environment, U.S. Department of 
Defense noted that: 
[K]ey factors aggravate what would otherwise be a much more limited 
problem. First, is the aging nature of our radar infrastructure. Our long-
range radar is particularly old, decades old. Many still use analog 
technology, which has limited ability to filter out wind turbine clutter. 
Second, the FAA’s [Federal Aviation Administration’s] citing review . . . is 
itself a kind of a legacy system. It . . . has not been updated to take account 
of current national security needs and operations. Most significant, a 
developer only has to give the FAA 30 days notice of the start of 
construction . . . . This is generally adequate for the FAA’s purposes, but if 
we raise a concern at that late stage . . . we can create serious financial and 
execution challenges for the developer.47 
                                                   
 41. See id. 
 42. See WIND TECHNOLOGIES MARKET REPORT, supra note 1, at 26. 
 43. See id. 
 44. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG’G, REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES: THE EFFECT OF WINDMILL FARMS ON 
MILITARY READINESS, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. 52-56 (2006). 
 45. Information Paper On: NORAD Radar System Interference Caused by 
Wind Turbines, U.S. DOD (onsite research conducted under the direction of the 
author). 
 46. See id. 
 47. Wind Farms: Compatible with Military Readiness?: Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Readiness of the Committee on Armed Services, 111th Cong. 6 
(2010) (statement of Dr. Dorothy Robyn, Deputy under Sec’y of Def., Installations & 
Env’t, U.S. Dept. of Def.). The process issue will be discussed more fully below. See 
infra Part III. 
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Radar technology has improved greatly since the majority of 
DOD’s radar systems went online.48 Newer radars can, in theory, 
handle more interference, which would create an enhanced ability to 
deal with interference from wind farms. However, until such 
improvements are integrated into the national security grid, they 
remain irrelevant to the current threat assessment. Furthermore, even 
the most modern technology remains inadequate to the task of 
accurately measuring interference.49 
A. How Radars Function 
Understanding how wind power generation can interfere with 
radar systems requires some basic familiarity with how radar works. 
The process begins when an emitter pulses energy outward in the form 
of radio frequency (rf) waves between three megahertz and 100 
gigahertz.50 Any object struck by the pulse reflects some of that energy 
back.51 That reflected energy is then collected by the emitter’s antenna 
and analyzed.52 The weaker the energy reflected back to the antenna, 
the more difficult the information is to process.53 The signal’s strength 
depends on the power of the transmitter, its distance to the target, 
atmospheric effects, the radar cross-section54 of the target, and 
interference caused by other objects and the antenna geometry.55  
Unwanted reflected signals are called “clutter.”56 Objects within 
the path of the radar can affect the wave’s propagation characteristics, 
or how the waves travel. This can include actual blockage of the 
                                                   
 48. See, e.g., Air Force Tech Report: Ground Based Radar Early Warning 
System, U.S. AIR FORCE (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.af.mil/News/Article-
Display/Article/1503094/air-force-tech-report-ground-based-radar-early-warning-
system/ [https://perma.cc/25D3-HLR4]. 
 49. See Wind Turbine Radar Interference Mitigation (WTRIM), SANDIA 
NAT’L LABS., https://energy.sandia.gov/energy/renewable-energy/wind-power/wind-
turbine-siting-and-barrier-mitigation/wtrim/ [https://perma.cc/4L29-59PE] (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2018) (recognizing that models and mitigation strategies still need to 
be done to fully understand the level of interference and technology required to 
combat interference). 
 50. See DEP’T OF DEF., THE EFFECT OF WINDMILL FARMS ON MILITARY 
READINESS 10 (2006). 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF. RESEARCH & ENG’G, supra note 44, at 10. 
The radar cross section (RCS) is the “size” of the object, or in other words how much 
radar energy that object will reflect back. See id. The larger the object, the larger its 
RCS. See id. 
 55. See id. at 10-11. 
 56. See id. at 11.  
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waves, causing shadowing behind the object.57 Objects in areas of 
complete shadow are invisible to radar while objects in partial shadow 
are detectable, albeit with difficulty.58 A third form of shadowing, 
known as diffraction, arises when a radar signal hits a line of objects.59 
When this occurs, the waves are altered, making it difficult to detect 
objects of interest.60 The spacing of the turbines on wind farms makes 
diffraction the most common form of interference caused by wind-
power generation.61 Clutter also causes difficulty when a receiver 
picks up two different signals simultaneously as a result of the 
obstruction, rendering the primary signal undetectable.62 The varied 
effects of reflected and diffracted signals make the interference 
capability of large wind turbines hard to quantify.  
B. Challenges to National Security 
From a national security perspective, clutter and interference 
caused by wind farms pose significant concerns.63  
As wind turbines continue to be installed, and as advances in wind energy 
technology enable wind farms to be deployed in new regions of the country, 
the probability for wind development to present conflicts with radar 
missions related to air traffic control, weather forecasting, homeland 
security, and national defense is also likely to increase, as is the potential 
severity of those conflicts.64  
This statement is cause for significant concern. Wind-energy 
construction will cause more and more severe instances of radar 
interference.  
Wind farms are often developed in agricultural areas with 
expansive, available land.65 Accordingly, large-scale farms have been 
                                                   
 57. See id. at 13.  
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See Florian Krug & Bastian Lewke, Electromagnetic Interference on 
Large Wind Turbines, 2 ENERGIES 1118 (2009).  
 63. See FEDERAL INTERAGENCY WIND TURBINE RADAR INTERFERENCE 
MITIGATION STRATEGY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY 1 (2016), https://www.energy.gov/ 
sites/prod/files/2016/06/f32/Federal-Interagency-Wind-Turbine-Radar-Interference-
Mitigation-Strategy-02092016rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/SWK2-78AD] [hereinafter 
FEDERAL INTERAGENCY REPORT]. 
 64. See id. at vii. 
 65. See Wind Energy, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.nationalgeographic. 
org/encyclopedia/wind-energy/ [https://perma.cc/ZXU2-MCVG] (last visited Sept. 
24, 2018). 
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built across the country from California to New England.66 Similarly, 
the United States has radar stations (early-warning stations and air-
traffic control stations) located from coast to coast:  
 
 
The picture on the left depicts all of the major airports in the 
United States (a section of air-traffic control radars), and on the right 
are the early-warning radar locations.67 The early-warning radars are a 
joint effort with Canada and were put in place in the 1980s, replacing 
the Distance Early Line Radars.68 Of those radars that remain 
operational, remedial work for many was completed in the early 1990s 
and for a few more in 2005.69 Also in 2005, budgetary concerns led to 
the deactivation of others.70 By 2015, more than twenty-five long-
range radars were updated to full operational capability.71 The 
upgrades have increased the surveillance, advanced warning, and 
troubleshooting capabilities of the long-range radars; however, many 
upgrades are still to come.72  
                                                   
 66. See Paul Rogers, New Map Shows Wind Farms Spreading Rapidly Across 
the US, MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 11, 2017, 6:35 AM), 
https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/08/10/NEW-MAP-SHOWS-WIND-FARMS-
SPREADING-RAPIDLY-ACROSS-US/ [https://perma.cc/3UG6-L8BQ]. 
 67. See North Warning System, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/North_Warning_System [https://perma.cc/XHH7-8C5B] (last visited Sept. 24, 
2018). Northern Command, a branch of DOD in charge of the long-range radars, 
directed us to the cited Wikipedia page for information on the age and locations of 
their radar. See id. 
 68. See James E. Bollinger, North Warning System, http://www.radomes 
.org/museum/NorthWarningSystem.php [https://perma.cc/J9RZ-MQMK] (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2018). 
 69. See North Warning System, supra note 67. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See Patty Welsh, Radar Upgrades Ensure Situation Awareness, U.S. A.F. 
(Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.af.mil/NEWS/ARTICLE-DISPLAY/ARTICLE/ 
625117/RADAR-UPGRADES-ENSURE-SITUATION-AWARENESS/ 
[https://perma.cc/U7QN-MPTE]. 
 72. See Elwood Brehmer, DOD to Spend $325M on Clear Missile Defense 
Radar, ALA. J. OF COM. (Mar. 2, 2016, 3:10 PM), http://www.alaskajournal.com 
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The federal government knows how turbines can affect the radar 
stations, but to date, the effects have not been quantified.73 DOD 
expects radars to at least run at 80% efficiency; this means that some 
interference is expected and filtered out, and the radar is still 
functional.74 However, as mentioned above, DOD and other agencies 
have not been able to quantify when another turbine will push the 
amount of interference over the 20% allowable amount and cause the 
system to run at less than 80% efficiency. This means that DOD does 
not know when its radar is functioning effectively or when it is 
experiencing crippling interference. 
III. FEDERAL SITING PROCESS FOR WIND FARMS 
When a proposed wind farm reaches the threshold at which it 
needs federal approval,75 the FAA has exclusive authority to make 
determinations that will either allow the project to move forward or 
stop the project.76 This jurisdiction includes objects that could impact 
air navigation or DOD operations.77 The height requirement includes 
all wind turbines in the utility-scale group and some in the large 
commercial group discussed above.78  
Each wind turbine and project above 200 feet must receive FAA 
approval as part of its preconstruction commitments.79 This FAA 
process provides the only formal venue for DOD to contest the 
construction parameters of a wind-energy project.80 In the past, DOD 
was invited to consult only late in the process.81 DOD’s late entry into 
the process slowed the decision making because the FAA had to wait 
                                                   
/2016-03-02/dod-spend-325m-clear-missile-defense-radar#.WnJHq5Oplo4 
[https://perma.cc/M2EH-VR4T].  
 73. Presentation: Energy, Urban Development and Aerospace Capabilities 
Deconfliction Branch, NORAD J36R, (Feb. 21, 2012).  
 74. See Colonel Felix A. Losco & Major Thomas F. Collick, When Wind, 
Wind Turbines, and Radar Mix – A Case Study, 68 A.F. L. REV. 235, 242 (2012). 
 75. The FAA has jurisdiction over construction and alteration of objects 
exceeding 200 feet in height. 14 C.F.R. § 77.9 (2018). 
 76. See id. § 77.31. 
 77. See 20% WIND ENERGY BY 2030, supra note 25. 
 78. See id.  
 79. See § 77.9. 
 80. DOD can hold up wind farms when they are in the FAA process, but the 
DOD determination is still part of the FAA process. See infra Section III.B. DOD 
does not have a separate process of its own in which it gives the public determinations. 
See id. 
 81. See Juliet Eilperin, Pentagon Objections Hold Up Oregon Wind Farm, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2010, 9:09 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/04/15/AR2010041503120.html [https://perma.cc/BK2C-
99JZ]. 
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for DOD input before issuing a formal decision.82 The process has 
since streamlined.83 However, it seems counterintuitive that the FAA 
retains exclusive jurisdiction over a process with potentially 
significant impacts on national security. It is therefore worth 
examining this process in detail.  
A. The FAA Approval Process 
Although wind farms require federal approval, an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is not required.84 NEPA requires 
that any major federal action with potentially significant 
environmental impact be preceded by an analysis of environmental 
impacts and a discussion of possible alternatives.85 Federal actions of 
an advisory nature, however, are excluded from NEPA requirements.86 
Determinations by the FAA dealing with obstruction of air space are 
considered to be advisory and therefore not a major federal action 
under NEPA.87 This means that the only federal requirement for the 
approval of a wind farm is a determination by the FAA as to whether 
the object unduly obstructs air space.88 
The FAA approval process is straightforward. If a proposed 
project is under the FAA’s jurisdiction, then a Notice of Proposed 
Construction is required.89 After the Notice is issued, the FAA must 
study the proposed project or object and make a determination.90 
Following an initial aeronautical study, the FAA will issue one of the 
following: Determination of No Hazard to Air Navigation (DNH) or 
Notice of Presumed Hazard (NPH).91 During the hazard-evaluation 
process, DOD can offer input and analysis on the potential effects on 
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national security, including interference with military radar systems.92 
However, the FAA has final authority when issuing a determination 
on proposed projects and can override any DOD objections.93 
If the project receives a DNH, the project can proceed as 
planned, and no further agency action is required.94 If the project 
receives an NPH, the FAA conducts an in-depth technical analysis to 
explain the cause of the NPH and evaluate the impacts.95 The FAA 
then negotiates with the regulated entity to change the parameters of 
the project to allow the project to continue.96 If no agreement on 
modifications emerges, the FAA issues a Determination of Hazard.97 
A Determination of Hazard halts construction of the project with no 
further consideration by the FAA.98 
B. The DOD Process 
Wind interference with military radar has become a serious 
policy concern only in the last decade. In 2005, Congress attached a 
rider to an appropriations bill requiring DOD to study the impacts of 
wind energy on military radars and issue a report.99 In March 2006, 
DOD, along with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), issued 
a temporary ruling, which prevented the construction of wind energy 
plants within the sightlines of military radar facilities.100 Once the 
study was complete, DOD revoked the ruling and decided 
                                                   
 92. See DoD Preliminary Screening Tool, FAA, 
https://oeaaa.faa.gov/oeaaa/external/gisTools 
/gisAction.jsp?action=showLongRangeRadarToolForm [https://perma.cc/387W-
AN7T] (last visited Sept. 24, 2018); see also DoD Siting Clearinghouse Reviews, OFF. 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY DEF., https://www.acq.osd.mil/dodsc/contact/dod-review-
process.html [https://perma.cc/8CQG-WC9R]. 
 93. Informational Paper on: NORAD Radar System Interference Caused by 
Wind Turbines, NORAD J36R/554-5265 (Apr. 17, 2012). 
 94. See 14 C.F.R. § 77.31(d) (2011). 
 95. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ORDER JO 7400.2K, 
PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING AIRSPACE MATTERS 7-1-1 (Apr. 3, 2014), 
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/7400.2K_w_ 
Chg1_dtd_7-24-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UCU-W5YD]. 
 96. See id. at 7-1-2. 
 97. See FAA Determinations, supra note 90. The FAA can also issue a 
Determination of No Hazard with Conditions that allows the project to continue 
subject to mitigating measures such as lighting or marking. See id. 
 98. Regardless of the determination, the FAA determinations are appealable. 
See id. 
 99. See DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 50. 
 100. JEFFREY LOGAN & STAN MARK KAPLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL34546, WIND POWER IN THE UNITED STATES: TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMIC, AND 
POLICY ISSUES 35 (2008). 
600 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
determinations were to be made on a case-by-case basis.101 DOD 
recognized the need to develop mitigation strategies beyond merely 
preventing the development of wind turbines in the line of sight.102 
Accordingly, DOD initiated research to determine future mitigation 
strategies.103 
In addition to independent determinations made by DOD, a 
number of sub-agencies also participate in the permitting process. The 
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is an 
American-Canadian bilateral organization charged with maintaining 
and using the early-warning air defense radars.104 The United States 
Northern Command (US NORTHCOM) is the body within DOD that 
coordinates homeland security efforts.105 Different branches of the 
military also have radar systems under their control, which could be 
affected by wind turbines.106 It bears stressing that neither DOD nor 
any of its branches have any independent regulatory authority.107 FAA 
makes the final determination regarding proposed wind projects and 
can green-light proposed projects even over DOD objections.108  
Prior to Congress’ adoption of the Ike Skelton National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2011 (ISNDA),109 DOD was not responding to 
wind power projects in a timely and coherent manner.110 One of the 
objectives of ISNDA was to develop a process through which DOD 
would aid in the development of renewable resources while 
minimizing any adverse effects on military readiness.111 This 
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legislation changed how DOD responds to projects internally and 
aimed to foster coordination between all stakeholders within DOD.112 
Section 358 of ISNDA discusses fostering wind-energy development 
and improving DOD responses to the FAA during the permitting 
process.113 These measures in theory allow NORAD, US 
NORTHCOM, the Air Force, and others to efficiently respond to 
projects pending before the FAA by implementing a formal procedure 
for the agencies to follow.  
The first step in the retooled DOD internal procedure is Triage, 
during which DOD performs a preliminary assessment with the FAA’s 
raw data.114 The next step is an 84 RADES assessment.115 The 84th 
Radar Evaluation Squadron, the entity tasked with assessing impacts 
on radar systems, performs an 84 RADES assessment.116 If the 84th 
Radar Evaluation Squadron finds that a project will have a moderate 
to severe impact on radar systems, the analysis shifts to the 
Operational Risk Assessment (ORA) team for a more in-depth 
assessment. 
This revised process mitigates earlier problems arising from late 
DOD involvement in the FAA approval process.117 ORA considers 
technical and operational mitigation options and can take one of two 
actions: (1) approve the project and accept the risk, or (2) request DOD 
coordination with the FAA in issuing a Determination of Hazard.118 
Requesting coordination with FAA personnel on a particular case 
allows more DOD involvement in FAA’s process and a greater say in 
the outcome of a hazard determination. DOD is likely to ask to 
coordinate with FAA only in circumstances where the risk to a radar 
station is deemed substantial.119 
In sum, the responsibility for approving or denying a wind 
energy facility permit rests solely with the FAA.120 This remains true 
despite the acknowledged threat that wind-energy constructions can 
pose to military radars.121 Furthermore, and perhaps more concerning, 
is the fact that the threat wind turbines pose to aviation radars has not 
been fully quantified and indeed may be impossible to accurately 
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measure.122 Even with the new procedures in place, DOD’s role 
remains strictly advisory.123 Without the regulatory authority to deny 
wind farm developers the ability to develop, DOD is at the mercy of 
the FAA decision-making process.  
A wind farm operating in Boardman, Oregon offers a useful 
illustration of the interplay between DOD and the FAA.124 A case 
study of this facility, known as Shepherds Flat, illustrates how both 
agencies must make determinations in the absence of crucially 
relevant data.125 As shown below, the federal government knows the 
type of interference wind turbines cause and that radar systems can 
deal with a certain amount of interference and still perform 
adequately. However, no one knows how to predict when one turbine 
will produce an amount of interference that will cause radar systems 
to perform inadequately.126 
IV. UNCERTAINTIES IN CALCULATING THE COST OF WIND ENERGY:  
A CASE STUDY OF BOARDMAN, OREGON—SHEPHERDS FLAT 
Assessing the value of a wind-energy facility can be challenging. 
The benefits (clean, renewable energy) are obvious. But when a 
facility can pose an immeasurable potential threat to air defense 
systems, the cost-benefit analysis becomes more complicated. 
The Shepherds Flat wind farm in northeastern Oregon is the third 
largest operational wind farm in the country and one of the largest 
onshore wind farms in the world.127 In 2010, Caithness Energy 
proposed the addition of 338 new turbines across 32,100 acres of 
land.128 The proposed construction promised a generating capacity of 
845 MW, enough to power 227,000 households.129 
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The Pentagon threatened to derail the project and other 
renewable energy projects in the area.130 This project and seven others 
were temporarily suspended because of potential interference with a 
long-range air defense radar system near Fossil, Oregon.131 In March 
2010, the FAA rejected the project and issued an NPH based on 
concerns from the Air Force, NORAD, and US NORTHCOM that the 
turbines could detrimentally affect nearby radars.132 Specifically, the 
NPH stated that the proposed turbines would be located within the 
radar line-of-sight of the Fossil station and could “seriously impair the 
ability of the [DOD] to detect, monitor[,] and safely conduct air 
operations in this region.”133  
FAA’s rejection came two months before the project was to 
break ground. Unsurprisingly, the decision engendered considerable 
criticism.134 Caithness Executive Vice President Ross Ain declared: 
“We’re extremely disappointed that the concerns raised by the Air 
Force at the 25th hour threatens [sic] to crater literally billions of 
dollars of renewable energy in the United States and tens of thousands 
of jobs in renewable energy.”135 Ain’s frustration was understandable. 
At the time DOD became involved with the Shepherds Flat proposal, 
the project had already been in the works for nine years,136 and the 
ISNDA had not yet been enacted. Consequently, DOD was asked to 
consult with the FAA very late in the process.137  
DOD eventually concurred with the issuance of a DNH by FAA 
for Shepherds Flat.138 However, it retained serious concerns about the 
project because it remained unable to determine the impact individual 
wind turbines would have on the radar station.139 In February 2010, 
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DOD recommended that FAA consider the project a hazard.140 It 
determined that the proposed project “as planned, [would] cause loss 
of radar coverage to a level that increases operational risk to an 
unacceptable level.”141 NORAD and US NORTHCOM then evaluated 
the operational impact of the project and recommended mitigation 
strategies “that may eliminate the interference or reduce it to the 
maximum extent possible.”142 Among the mitigation strategies were 
two recommended alternate areas for the proposed turbines.143 DOD 
also proposed masking the turbines.144 Without masking, DOD feared 
that the project would: 
[D]rive the radar processing constraints to such a high level that it [would] 
provide questionable coverage throughout the entire radar coverage 
volume. This reduction in capability comes in the form of erroneous aircraft 
returns and/or suppressed aircraft returns. Unreliable coverage directly 
impacts flight safety, intercept operations, and may prevent detection of 
new targets.145  
If the Fossil, Oregon radar station became unreliable, the next 
closest radar station was in Salem, Oregon, over 200 miles away.146 
DOD further explained that if a security threat was in the area and the 
military became unable to launch a counter attack from Fossil due to 
a threat assessment failure, the next closest base lay over 500 miles 
away.147 Of main concern was the potential inability of the radars to 
provide targeting information that would signal NORAD to launch 
fighter aircrafts in response to a threat.148 
In April 2010, following the Air Force’s objections and FAA’s 
rejection of the project, DOD conducted a study with the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology to develop mitigation 
measures.149 The results suggested that the project would be less 
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detrimental to the Fossil station than previously thought, and that 
certain software could be incorporated at the Fossil station to 
differentiate between real and false targets.150 There are “options, 
based on . . . experiments they ran . . . from adjusting the settings to 
optimiz[ing] the existing technology to inserting new technology, such 
as an adaptive clutter map that can edit out false targets.”151 On April 
30, 2012, after years of evaluating the project, the Air Force withdrew 
its initial objections, deciding instead to implement the upgrades 
recommended by the study.152  
Although DOD withdrew its objections, concerns remained.153 
For example, the Navy submitted the following statement: 
[W]hile the evaluation determined the structures do not meet the FAA 
standards for an adverse aeronautical effect; construction of wind turbines 
does pose a high risk of unacceptable impact to national security and 
operation impact to the Department of the Navy in conducting low altitude 
tactical and surface to air counter-tactics training. As such, request the FAA 
include a statement in the Aeronautical Study requesting the developer 
coordinate with the Executive Director, Department of Defense Siting 
Clearinghouse.154  
As mentioned, these objections were included in the notice that 
approved the project.155 That means the FAA issued a DNH even 
though divisions of DOD still objected to the project.  
The problem from DOD’s perspective was not just this particular 
project, but rather what could happen when other developers or the 
current developer wished to develop even more turbines in the same 
location. The real gap in knowledge lies in the inability to determine 
how much degradation a particular radar station will experience from 
any given turbine or turbines.156 Thus, even though DOD updated the 
radar system in this particular instance, it still cannot definitively state 
that these wind turbines will not affect its radar in an unacceptable 
way. Phrased differently, DOD knows the facility poses a threat but it 
cannot accurately assess the severity of the threat. Nevertheless, it 
withdrew its objections to the project. 
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This decision is particularly concerning since radar upgrades can 
sometimes exacerbate problems.157 For example, in 2006 the Air Force 
temporarily upgraded its air traffic control radar at the Travis Air 
Force Base in Solano County, California only to find that the upgrade 
led to more interference.158 In that instance, the Air Force upgraded 
from an analog to a digital system; this led to random weather cells 
causing operators to lose track of planes they were following.159 The 
simple truth is DOD does not know when a turbine will cause too 
much interference even for an updated radar system. It makes 
educated guesses, which may or may not be accurate. This seems a 
heady gamble to make with national security.160  
V. CURRENT MITIGATION STRATEGIES 
Though DOD’s role remains advisory, the federal government 
as a whole has recently started taking the issue more seriously. In 
January 2016, the Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Division 
of the DOE released a report offering ideas for mitigating radar 
interference from wind technology.161 In this report, DOE 
acknowledged the detrimental effects that wind technology can exert 
on air-traffic control, weather forecasting, homeland security, and 
national defense, and created a working group to focus on potential 
mitigation strategies.162 The working group is comprised of multiple 
federal agencies including the DOE, DOD, FAA, and the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).163  
By 2025, the working group intends to “fully address wind 
turbine radar interference as an impact to critical radar missions, 
ensure the long-term resilience of radar operations in the presence of 
wind turbines, and remove radar interference as an impediment to 
future wind energy development.”164 In order to accomplish these 
objectives, the working group developed three strategic themes: 
 
1. Improving the capacity of government and industry to evaluate the 
impacts of existing and planned wind energy installations on sensitive 
radar systems[;] 
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2. Developing and facilitating the deployment of hardware and software 
mitigation measures to increase the resilience of existing radar systems 
to wind turbines[; and] 
3. Encouraging the development of next-generation radar systems that 
are resistant to wind turbine radar interference. 165 
 
The working group seeks to develop new tools and improve the 
capabilities of existing tools so as to more effectively identify the 
impacts of wind technology on military radar systems.166 Through 
modeling and simulation tools, wind developers and government 
entities can then mitigate any negative impacts prior to construction.167 
Among the existing pre-construction mitigation strategies is 
DOD’s Preliminary Screening Tool.168 This tool allows wind 
developers to obtain a preliminary review of potential effects of their 
proposed development on long-range air defense and national security 
radars, military training routes, and special airspaces.169 This tool 
operates by identifying the longitude and latitude of the proposed 
development and the type of radar to be affected—long-range, military 
training, or special airspace, for example.170 Once these factors are 
identified, the tool uses a color-coded system to rate the project. Green 
means no impact, yellow is likely impact, and red denotes a high 
likelihood of impact.171  
A second interference mitigation strategy—Tools for Siting, 
Planning, and Encroachment Analysis of Renewables—was 
developed in collaboration with five government entities (DOE, DOD, 
DHS, FAA at the Department of Transportation, and NOAA) and 
Sandia National Laboratories.172 It aims to identify barriers to 
renewable energy development (e.g., radar interference) and develop 
appropriate mitigation strategies.173 This tool models the potential 
impacts of the wind development and creates a scorecard of the 
estimated impact on radar systems.174 As of this writing, both tools 
were available for developers’ use but not required.175  
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The objectives of the second phase of the working group strategy 
include: (1) facilitating the deployment of current existing mitigation 
measures, (2) deploying hardware and software upgrades to make 
existing radars more resilient, (3) improving the capacity of existing 
automation and command and control systems, and (4) exploring at-
the-turbine mitigation methods to reduce radar impacts.176 The final 
strategic objective involves ensuring that new radar developments 
address wind-turbine interference during the design development 
process.177 This will require collaboration with radar developers to 
build “radars that are more robust to wind turbines [as] a long-term 
solution to wind turbine radar interference.”178 Many such radars have 
already been developed (e.g., Multi-Function Phased Array Radar, 
Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar) and provide 
models from which future developers will work.179 
In sum, the objectives of the working group—including 
simulation models, upgraded software, and design development 
initiatives—will theoretically aid in the recognition of radar 
interference prior to the construction of wind energy projects.180 
However, the seven-year time horizon for implementing these 
strategies leaves a sizeable gap during which the ever-expanding 
development of wind could detrimentally interfere with national 
security. And that interference may not be measured or even noticed 
because DOD cannot measure interference if it lacks a functioning 
method of determining whether such interference exists.  
While this knowledge gap is neither surprising nor an 
insurmountable challenge, it does underscore a serious flaw in the 
federal response to uncertainty. Because the government has been 
slow to recognize the severity and breadth of the problem, the United 
States faces acknowledged gaps in its air defense systems without 
knowing exactly where and how severe those gaps are or how to 
effectively remedy them. While all complex systems contain 
uncertainty,181 and addressing and allowing for the unknown factors 
forms part of any functional risk management strategy,182 the wind-
turbine and radar-interference problem projects an untenable level of 
uncertainty into a highly volatile and already risk-laden environment. 
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VI. UNCERTAINTY AS A POLICY ISSUE AND TOOL 
Uncertainty plays an important role in policymaking and stems 
from either a lack of information, lack of access to information, or 
both.183 When the lack of information is measurable, we call it risk. 
When the information deficit cannot be measured (i.e., it is unknown 
or unquantifiable), that “raw” uncertainty lies outside the bounds of 
ascertainable risk and cannot be integrated into a risk assessment. 
Elsewhere Romulo Sampaio and I have divided these two distinct 
stages into “hard” and “soft” uncertainty.184  
Hard uncertainty refers to when the triggering event or 
circumstances are known but the probabilities of possible outcomes or 
even the outcomes themselves defy prediction.185 Soft uncertainty 
applies to circumstances where potential outcomes and their 
probabilities can be projected.186 In such cases, risks can be assessed.187 
Consequently, soft uncertainty scenarios are subject to cost-benefit 
analysis whereas instances of hard uncertainty are not. As noted earlier 
and discussed in more detail below, both hard and soft uncertainty 
present themselves in the interaction between wind turbines and 
military radars. 
Uncertainty necessarily complicates decision making. Accurate 
risk assessment (upon which sound decision-making relies) requires 
the best available information and technology, both of which vary 
widely depending on region and circumstances. It also bears 
emphasizing that risk assessment is inherently subjective and region 
specific.188 Policy decisions can never equally favor all parties. They 
necessarily generate social costs that must be allocated amongst 
stakeholders (and sometimes among those without any definable 
interest). Sound policy making therefore involves choices that create 
different impacts across demographically and geographically distinct 
communities, even while seeking to minimize global risk.  
Perceptions of risk and the advisability of potential responses 
can also vary widely.189 For example, some nations might accept the 
risks of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in light of the boost 
it could provide to their agricultural sectors, while others reject such 
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risks because the dangers of GMOs outweigh any potential gains.190 
Or, on a more micro level, a town might close a beach because of rip 
currents, to the consternation of many vacationers willing (and in 
many cases able) to assess and address the risks of swimming under 
such conditions. 
A. Utilizing a Precautionary Principle 
The law imposes regulatory demands that create opportunity 
through restraint. The nature of hard uncertainty requires 
policymakers to act in the face of unknown and unknowable risk.191 
This seemingly precludes rational policymaking since reasoned 
analysis is impossible in the absence of information.192 Yet, even as 
the nature of the uncertainty (or even its existence) cannot be known, 
reducing asymmetric information can reveal previously unknown 
risks by, for example, bringing local knowledge to bear on a problem 
about whose existence the larger community was unaware.193 This 
process can shift previously unknown unknowns (hard uncertainty) 
into the realm of known unknowns (soft uncertainty), thereby enabling 
rational risk assessment and creating opportunity.194 This approach 
undergirds the Precautionary Principle and could prove particularly 
useful in assessing the viability of particular wind-energy projects 
amidst uncertainty about radar interference.  
B. Degree of Risk & Probability Neglect  
Simply stated, the Precautionary Principle signifies that an 
information deficit cannot justify decisions that put people or the 
environment at risk.195 In this sense, precaution need not (and does not) 
mean risk aversion.196 It rather means that functional risk assessment 
accounts for the equitable distribution of as yet unknown harms and 
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impacts.197 It offers a framework for rational decision making in a 
context of uncertainty.198 
The degree of openness to risk may be expressed in terms of the 
ratio of soft to hard uncertainty.199 When soft uncertainties (known 
unknowns) predominate, cost-benefit analyses gain coherence and 
risk assessment becomes a tool for mitigating harm and alleviating 
concern. While uncertainty remains, likelihoods of potential outcomes 
become measurable.  
In hard-uncertainty scenarios, policymakers do not know what 
they do not know and act out of ignorance. Such actions are 
necessarily rash and can involve reactions to the specter of risk rather 
than the risk itself. A feedback loop results that diverts resources away 
from risk assessment and toward rearguard measures aimed at 
safeguarding the status quo.200 Rather than examine the implications 
of a situation, people try and think of comparable examples.201 If an 
example comes readily forward, it can form the basis for the societal 
response even if its incidence is statistically rare.202  
For instance, the federal government devotes enormous time and 
resources to deterring and deporting undocumented immigrants, citing 
a danger to national security.203 Yet, the statistical correlation between 
illegal immigration and domestic terrorism is remarkably low.204 This 
tendency to focus on areas of low risk but heightened fear leads to 
what Kuran and Sunstein have labeled an “availability cascade,” 
                                                   
 197. See generally id.  
 198. See id. at 875. 
 199. See Cassuto & Sampaio, supra note 181. 
 200. See Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and 
Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 98-100 (2002). 
 201. See id. at 85-86. 
 202. See id. 
 203. See Emmarie Huetteman & Caitlin Dickerson, With His Guests, Trump 
to Highlight Illegal Immigration as a Security Issue, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/us/politics/first-ladys-box-guest-list.html 
[https://perma.cc/G2ZP-M5JL]. 
 204. Dave Bobkoff, Dave Mosher, & Skye Gould, Trump’s Speech 
Highlighted Victims of Crimes by Immigrants – But a Look at the Data Shows It’s 
Incredibly Rare, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 1, 2017, 11:15 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-voice-office-for-victims-of-immigrant-
crime-numbers-not-necessary-2017-3 [https://perma.cc/U2RV-97MZ] (noting data 
explains that the likelihood of an American being murdered by an undocumented 
immigrant terrorist is 1 in 10.9 billion). It also bears noting that U.S. nationals commit 
the majority of domestic terrorism with weapons obtained legally. See id. Yet, there, 
the federal government has shown no willingness to stop the proliferation of firearms. 
See Elizabeth Chuck, More than 80 Percent of Guns in Mass Shootings Obtained 
Legally, NBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2015, 12:02 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ 
san-bernardino-shooting/more-80-percent-guns-used-mass-shootings-obtained-
legally-n474441 [https://perma.cc/3QZ2-EYTU]. 
612 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
wherein the ensuing abundance of information about the perceived 
low-risk action makes it increasingly difficult to obtain information 
about other more serious threats.205 Those who doubt the perceived 
risk begin doubting themselves, thereby silencing an important 
constituency whose opinions might lead to more rational behavior.206 
The result of these linked phenomena is “probability neglect,” 
wherein feelings of fear cause people to ignore probabilities and focus 
instead on the worst case irrespective of the greater danger from other 
causes.207 Probability neglect diverts resources away from serious 
dangers and concentrates them instead on palliating social unease.208 
The result is increased hard uncertainty, which in turn leads to greater 
probability neglect. This poorly conceived precautionary approach has 
led to significant societal dysfunction and mismanagement of 
resources.209 
Not all precautionary approaches to hard uncertainty are 
irrational, however. Postponing projects or regulatory action until 
information can be gathered and analyzed is itself a form of cost-
benefit analysis.210 It posits that the benefits of immediate action or 
regulation are outweighed by those gained through information 
gathering.211 That is the case with respect to interactions between wind 
turbines and military radars.  
1. Interference Presents a Hard Uncertainty Scenario 
As earlier noted, hard uncertainty refers to situations where the 
triggering event is known but possible outcomes cannot be predicted 
or even known.212 Wind turbines interfering with radars fit within this 
definition. The triggering event (turbine construction within territory 
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surveilled by aviation radar) is known. Possible outcomes 
(interference or lack thereof) are also known.213  
However, the limitations of existing technology make 
calculating the probabilities of possible outcomes impossible. We 
cannot know if a given project causes interference, whether expanding 
it will cause interference, or whether the interference, if known, could 
be successfully mitigated. This inability to determine whether a threat 
even exists makes calculating possible outcomes impossible—a 
textbook example of hard uncertainty.214 
2. Compromised Radar Presents a Significant Risk, But So Too 
Does a Failure to Develop Renewable Energy Sources 
If military radar fails to function, incoming threats—from 
ballistic missiles to hostile aircraft—could escape notice and cause 
horrific damage. This risk is heightened by the nature of the hard 
uncertainty that potential interference causes. If DOD does not know 
if and how the air defense system might be compromised, it cannot 
know of a threat’s existence or its dimensions. It therefore cannot take 
any steps to mitigate the danger. Thus, the military currently faces the 
possibility of a compromised air defense system while lacking the 
ability to determine whether the problem actually exists, its extent, or 
how to mitigate it. 
Failing to develop wind energy also presents risks and hard 
uncertainty. Should the United States continue its reliance on fossil 
fuels, it faces continued degradation of the air, soil, and water, 
expanding human health threats, as well as species and habitat loss.215 
In addition, the dangers of a disrupted climate grow daily more severe. 
Without a drastically lowered global carbon output, which will 
necessitate immediate action by the U.S. to lower its emissions, the 
impacts of climate change will worsen in ways that models are not yet 
adequate to predict.216  
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By contrast, both military radar and wind energy installations 
offer significant (and obvious) benefits.217 Radar is essential for 
maintaining homeland security while wind energy forms part of the 
suite of renewable alternatives that are also vital for national 
security.218 The question is not whether the respective costs of military 
radar and wind energy outweigh their benefits.219 The question rather 
is whether the risks of developing wind energy in proximity to radar 
installations outweigh the benefits they respectively and collectively 
offer.  
Since it is impossible to determine the extent of the risk, the 
analysis must focus instead on whether the Precautionary Principle 
should apply. As elaborated below, I argue that the answer is “yes.”220 
The permitting process for wind-energy facilities must be modified to 
address the information deficit and every effort made to retrofit 
existing facilities where wind turbines pose a potential hazard. 
3. The Danger of Availability Cascade & Probability Neglect 
Availability cascades occur when either the state, media, or both 
focus on issues that capture the popular imagination to the exclusion 
of other phenomena that require attention.221 One need only glance at 
the news to see any number of candidates competing to occupy the 
field to the exclusion of other important issues. One relevant and 
related example is the North Korean nuclear threat.222   
                                                   
had predicted in the past would result from global climate change are now occurring: 
loss of sea ice, accelerated sea level rise and longer, more intense heat waves.”). 
 217. See FEDERAL INTERAGENCY REPORT, supra note 63, at vii. 
 218. See C.N.A. MILITARY ADVISORY BOARD, ADVANCED ENERGY AND U.S. 
NATIONAL SECURITY I (2017), https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IRM-2017-U-
015512.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5XM-4KVH] (“U.S. leadership in advanced energy 
development and deployment can yield domestic and international opportunities 
across our national security spectrum. Should America embrace and accelerate the use 
of advanced energy sources, it can open new markets for a wide range of goods and 
services, promote prosperity in emerging economies, and establish new energy tethers 
and political influence.”). 
 219. Cf., e.g., Maeve White, Effect of Wind Turbines on Bird Mortality, 
http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2016/ph240/white1/ [https://perma.cc/H66H-
VNFG]; Brian F. Keane, Let’s Get Real on Wind Turbine Noise, HUFFINGTON POST 
(May 25, 2011), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-keane/lets-get-real-on-wind-
tur_b_754584.html [https://perma.cc/UKZ2-VSHM]. This is not to say that no costs 
exist. See White, supra note 219; Keane, supra note 219.  
 220. See infra Subsection VI.B.4 and accompanying text. 
 221. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 205, at 686. 
 222. See North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: What We Know, ALJAZEERA (Feb. 
20, 2018), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/north-korea-testing-nuclear-
weapons-170504072226461.html [https://perma.cc/TN6E-969Q]. 
 Under the Radar 615 
In this instance, North Korea’s nuclear posturing and the Trump 
Administration’s saber rattling provide genuine cause for concern.223 
North Korea has developed both the weapons and the delivery system 
to potentially target the United States mainland,224 and it has stated its 
desire to use them.225 The American diplomatic response has 
consisted—at least in part—of incendiary tweeting.226 One might think 
this and the many other regimes and non-state actors who have 
expressed a desire to harm the United States would spur increased 
interest in, and attention to, the military’s threat detection apparatus. 
This has not occurred.  
Instead, the availability cascade has spiraled into probability 
neglect. The Trump Administration has ignored expert advice and 
called for expanding the U.S. nuclear arsenal.227 Those calls come 
despite the fact that the U.S. already possess more nuclear weapons 
than every other country in the world excepting Russia228 The focus on 
building up the nation’s already superior nuclear capability has 
diverted attention and likely will divert resources away from 
upgrading the nation’s radar systems. This is despite the reality that 
the problem of interference and outdated technology presents a 
recognized, urgent, and ongoing threat to national security.229  
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4. A Way Forward: The Precautionary Principle 
The status quo with respect to wind turbines interfering with 
military radar is untenable and dangerous.230 Yet, both wind energy 
and radar are necessary to national security.231 Any solution must 
therefore acknowledge the role that they respectively play while 
offering a blueprint for a sustainable future. In short, despite 
entrenched antipathy in U.S. law and policy toward the Precautionary 
Principle,232 the conflict between wind and radar and the potentially 
disastrous consequences arising therefrom militate for a precautionary 
approach.233 
When absence of information creates or masks a threat, that 
incalculable risk must factor into sound decision making. This is the 
essence of the Precautionary Principle.234 Unlike, for example, the 
GMO dispute, where disagreement exists over whether GMOs pose 
any significant risk to humans or ecosystems,235 no one disputes the 
fact that wind turbines interfere with military radar. That potential 
interference represents a clear threat to national security.236 What is not 
known is the extent of the interference and the resulting dimension of 
the threat. Continuing to permit and build wind energy installations in 
proximity to military radar therefore seems foolhardy and 
unnecessary.  
Instead, caution is called for while the information deficit is 
addressed.237 Specifically, I propose the following: 
1. Suspend outstanding permit applications seeking to site 
wind turbines near radar facilities. Until the FAA and 
DOD possess the technological means to evaluate the 
potential threat, there should be no new construction that 
risks compromising the nation’s air defense capability. 
2. To the extent that more resources can expedite the 
timetable for DOD to complete its analysis on how best to 
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solve the interference problem, those resources should be 
made available. Easy conclusions stemming from 
availability cascades should be resisted. Instead, the focus 
must be on solving this under-publicized but urgent 
national security dilemma. The United States faces a clear 
and pressing problem with its national security 
infrastructure. To quote Arthur Miller in Death of a 
Salesman, “[a]ttention must be paid[!]”238 
3. If remedial measures with quantifiable and significant 
impact are possible now, they should be implemented 
immediately wherever wind turbines pose a potential 
hazard. This again may require diverting resources from 
more popular but less urgent or necessary projects.239 If no 
remedial measures are sufficient in the short term, then 
DOD should take whatever steps are necessary to make 
sure that there is working military radar in the region. 
4. Once the study is complete, DOD should move 
immediately to upgrade its radar systems. Permit 
applications for wind turbine installations can be unfrozen 
with construction contingent on a successful radar retrofit. 
This shared interest between the DOD and the energy 
sector in the rapid upgrade of the radar systems may offer 
a fruitful opportunity for cost-sharing.240 
These recommendations are not ideal. In a time of increasing 
climate disruption due to (among other things) carbon emissions from 
the energy sector, suspending new construction of wind energy 
facilities represents an unfortunate setback. However, renewable 
energy should be a boon to national security rather than a threat. 
Furthermore, these recommendations do not call for a moratorium on 
wind energy construction but just a suspension of new construction 
that lies in proximity to military radar. The renewable sector can 
weather this temporary setback. 
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CONCLUSION 
In sum, the nation’s radar systems are inadequate and unable to 
meet the challenge presented by increased demand for renewable 
energy. For too long the problem of wind-turbine interference was 
overlooked and underemphasized amid a ponderous permitting system 
that did not adequately allow for input from DOD and other 
stakeholders.241 The permitting process has been improved,242 the 
threat to national security recognized, and preliminary measures taken 
to address the problem.243 However, the problem remains for the 
foreseeable future and simply having a plan in place will not resolve 
interference problems that DOD cannot yet determine exist.244  
Consequently, the FAA must take immediate measures to 
safeguard the nation’s radar systems and delay any new potentially 
problematic wind energy construction until such time as they no 
longer pose a threat to national security. In the short term, siting wind 
turbines near military radar facilities deliberately creates hard 
uncertainty in a realm where the world is already uncertain enough. 
There is another path, however. And, unlike Yogi Berra’s proverbial 
fork in the road, the way forward is clear.245 
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